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1 Introduction
This paper studies the optimal rate of seigniorage in an economy characterized
by decentralized trade and a tax-evading underground sector. Previous authors
have addressed policy questions using environments in which both the formal and
underground markets are perfectly competitive (centralized markets). To the con-
trary, one-on-one meetings between buyers and sellers (decentralized exchange)
seem to be the more plausible trade arrangement that facilitates tax evasion. I
show that when trade is decentralized in both the formal and underground sectors,
the optimal rate of inflation is widely diﬀerent from what has been suggested in
the literature. That is, policymakers must revise their notions of optimal inflation
policy if they agree with the premise that decentralized trade is the better way
to model tax evasion. In terms of magnitudes, the underground-to-formal sector
output ratio is estimated to be about 8.8% in the US, 44% in Peru and 76% in
Nigeria [see Schneider and Enste (2000)].
The literature notes that only the formal sector is directly taxable. Taxes are
thus distortionary. An increase in the inflation rate increases seigniorage incomes.
With higher income from seigniorage, government no longer needs to tax as much
and the tax rate can be reduced, along with tax distortions. Lower taxes in turn
encourage formal sector production, as opposed to underground production. In
short, inflation causes a decline in underground output.1 This logic explains the
conventional wisdom claiming a negative relationship between changes in the rate
of inflation and changes in underground output. This negative “seigniorage rela-
tionship” is well-captured in the models with competitive markets.2 The data on
the other hand is far less conclusive. In Figure 3, I compare changes in inflation
to changes in underground output for several countries. There is very little if any
such negative correlation.3 Although there may be an endogeneity problem, this
1Specifically, I mean a decline in the underground-to-formal sector output ratio.
2See Cavalcanti and Villamil (2003) and Koreshkova (2006).
3In fact, regressing changes in inflation on changes in the underground-to-formal sector “out-
put ratio” generates coeﬃcients that are statistically not diﬀerent from zero.
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only cements the need for comprehensive modeling of the underground economy
to investigate the evidence at hand.
This paper seeks to provide a better understanding of how inflation aﬀects
underground output and how this may influence the optimal rate of inflation.
The working definition of the underground economy is that buyers in this sector
evade consumption taxes. Secondly, underground goods are of inferior quality.4
The model predicts that depending on certain market conditions (which I explain
next), inflation can either increase or decrease the underground sector. This rec-
onciles well with the data. The fact that inflation can move underground output
in both directions has pivotal implications for optimal inflation. That is, when
inflation reduces the underground sector (reduces tax evasion), seigniorage financ-
ing becomes very attractive. The optimal rate of inflation is therefore high. The
reverse is also true.
In the environment examined, households have buyers. Some buyers are sent
to the formal market, while others are sent to the underground market. If un-
derground goods are extremely poor in quality, a household sends relatively more
buyers to the formal market. Every household acts in the same way and pri-
vate interest overwhelms the social optimum. Therefore, there is the tendency for
overcrowding of buyers in the formal sector and trade opportunities become few
for each buyer in this sector.5 If the inflation rate increases, households try to
spend money faster.6 They divert buyers to the underground market, where the
overcrowding of buyers is less. The turnover of goods in the underground market
increases and underground output increases.
Notice that in the above analysis, inflation delivers the negative seigniorage
eﬀect; similar to the competitive models (thus, seigniorage income reduces taxes,
4Admittedly, there are a wide range of definitions of the underground economy. For the
purpose of this paper, I focus on this narrow definition.
5This of course depends on the allocation of sellers as well. For a full description of how I
treat sellers, see section 2. Also, one can think of “fewer trade opportunities” as equivalent to a
“lower probability of finding a match with a seller”.
6With higher inflation, households’ money stocks lose value quicker and they try to spend
money faster at currently prices rather than at future higher prices.
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which in turn reduce underground output). Here however, the overcrowding eﬀect
reverses the decline in underground output. Since inflation increases tax evasion,
seigniorage financing becomes less attractive and the optimal rate of inflation is
low compared to the literature.
On the other hand, if underground goods are of considerably good quality, the
underground market tends to be more crowded for underground buyers. Each
underground buyer has fewer trade opportunities. In response to higher inflation,
buyers move to the “less-crowded” formal market to spend money faster. Thus,
inflation reduces tax evasion on both fronts (seigniorage eﬀect and crowding eﬀect)
and seigniorage financing becomes more attractive. The optimal inflation rate is
high, as observed in some poor countries.
In relation to Figure 3, the results can be interpreted as follows. At a given
point in time, two countries can take opposite positions on the relative overcrowd-
ing of their formal and underground markets for buyers. Inflation hence impacts
their underground sectors in opposite directions. Secondly, over time, a single
country can switch states in the relative overcrowding of the two sector markets
for buyers. Thus, inflation moves underground output in reverse directions over
time. Putting these together, one can get data points that wrongly suggest no
relationship between changes in inflation and changes in the output ratio, similar
to Figure 3.
An environment with decentralized trade and market crowding is essential for
generating the results outlined. In the equivalent economies with perfectly compet-
itive markets, the distribution of goods from sellers to buyers is fully and equally
eﬃcient in both sectors. Money can thus be spent equally fast in both sectors
and households do not need to adjust buyer allocations in order to accomplish this
goal. Since the overcrowding eﬀect does not exist, this dimension has no eﬀect on
tax evasion. The optimal rate of inflation is thus unaﬀected. The overcrowding
eﬀect is peculiar to decentralized markets and is sometimes termed the “extensive
margin” or the “market congestion eﬀect”.
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The contributions of this paper are as follows. First, I build strong micro
foundations for the underground economy by including anonymity, which directly
motivates tax evasion. I show that the relative crowding/congestion of the two
markets is important for optimal inflation. I make a significant contribution to-
wards the integration of elaborate schemes of public finance into the monetary
search literature, following recent progress by Aruoba, Waller and Wright (2006).
I show that these models are indeed computable and that they can generate con-
clusions that are relevant for policy.
This paper adds to the existing monetary literature on the informal sector,
along side Koreshkova (2006), Cavalcanti and Villamil (2003) and Nicolini (1998).
Optimal policy in the presence of externalities follows fundamentals laid by Sandmo
(1975).7 The next section presents a two-sector monetary search framework, repli-
cating properties of the underground-formal dichotomy. In section 3, I characterize
the model and describe the equilibrium. Section 4 derives the price and output
ratios and examines how households adjust decisions when inflation changes. In
section 5, I calibrate the model to data from Peru and the US and present quan-
titative estimates of the impact of inflation. Section 6 considers robustness and
compares the results to some forerunners. I conclude in section 7.
2 Economic Environment
I extend the tractable framework introduced by Shi (1999) to allow for two sectors,
formal and underground/informal. These are denoted by the subscripts f and i
respectively and are assumed to be on separate islands. Goods are perishable
between periods, irrespective of the sector in which they are produced. By this, I
preclude the emergence of commodity money. Self-produced goods yield no utility
and hence trade is essential for worthwhile consumption. Some of these restrictions
are standard in monetary search models, as they permit trade and an endogenous
7Also see Ng (1980), Goulder (1995) and Bovenberg and van der Ploeg (1998).
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role for fiat money.
Time is discrete, denoted t. Money is the sole state variable. The economy
is inhabited by a large number of anonymous and infinitely-lived agents who are
either buyers or sellers/producers. For tractability, I collect agents into decision-
making families or households.8 A household is constituted by the measure s
of sellers and b of buyers; s ∈ (0,∞), b ∈ (0, s]. There are a large number
of households, and each household is infinitesimal compared to the aggregate.
The focus is on the representative household, who’s state and choice variables are
in lower-case letters. Capital-case variables represent those of other households
and the aggregate economy, which the representative household takes as given.
Economy-wide money supply is Mt, of which the representative household has mt.
There is no population growth; the number of households, sellers and buyers being
exogenous constants.
2.1 Market Congestion (Market Overcrowding)
The key mechanism driving the results in this paper is the potential for diﬀerences
in market congestion in the two sectors. Hence, I present this mechanism first.
Each household sends a fraction of its buyers and sellers to each sector market.
Let Bjt and Sjt be the aggregate number of buyers and sellers entering market j,
j = f, i. These agents match one-on-one and may trade if the match is successful.
A successful match occurs when any buyer meets a seller from a household other
than his own. The total number of successful matches, Xjt, is derived from the
matching function:
Xjt = BαjtS1−αjt , α ∈ (0, 1) , j = f, i .
8A related tractable environment proceeds with agents rather than households [see Lagos and
Wright (2005)].
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Also, define Bjt and Sjt as:
Bjt = XjtBjt =
µ
Sjt
Bjt
¶1−α
and
Sjt = XjtSjt =
µ
Bjt
Sjt
¶α
, j = f, i.
Then Bjt and Sjt are the market congestion/crowding rate for buyers and sellers
respectively.9 These can also be interpreted as the average matching rates per
buyer and per seller respectively. Since each household is infinitesimal, they take
market congestion rates as given. Holding sellers constant, the larger the number of
buyers entering market j, the higher is the market congestion/crowding for buyers
in that sector and the fewer the trade opportunities for each buyer in that sector.
Suppose there are more trade opportunities for each underground buyer than for
each formal buyer: Bit > Bft. In other words, the formal market is more crowded
for buyers than the underground sector. Then, an increase moves buyers to the
“less-crowded” underground market, given higher urgency to spend money stocks.
Buyers are moved underground to take advantage of better trade opportunities
there. That is, if output per trade is unaﬀected, then aggregate underground
output/turnover increases relative to formal sector output. Since inflation can
increase tax evasion, this makes seigniorage financing unattractive. The opposite
is the case when Bit < Bft. I focus on the market congestion rate for buyers only,
the reason for which will become apparent.
2.2 Household’s Problem
Household agents are altruistic towards fellow members. Let Ut be instantaneous
utility from consumption, net of the disutility of production. Φ (Qjt) = Q
φ
jt, φ > 1
is the disutility of producing Qjt units inside a match. Also, let the pair {qjt, xjt}
be the terms of trade whenever the representative household’s buyers engage in
9Note that BjtBjt = SjtSjt, j = f, i. Since it takes two to trade, one successfully matched
seller implies a successfully matched buyer. See Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001) for a survey of
related matching functions.
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purchases and {Qjt,Xjt} when the sellers engage in sales. Here, qjt (or Qjt) is the
quantity to be traded and xjt (or Xjt) is the monetary payment in currency. The
terms of trade will be discussed later but for now, it suﬃce to take these values as
given. The household’s problem is:
v (mt) = max
sjt,bjt,mjt,mt+1,j=f,i
Ut + βEv (mt+1) , β ∈ (0, 1) ,
subject to the terms of trade as well as:
Ut = cft + ηcit − sftSftΦ (Qft)− sitSitΦ (Qit) , (1)
cft = (1− τ) bftBftqft −Qgt , (2)
cit = bitBitqit , (3)
bft + bit ≤ b , (4)
sft + sit ≤ s , (5)
mft +mit ≤ mt , (6)
mt+1 −mt ≤ sftSftXft + sitSitXit + PftQgt − bftBftxft − bitBitxit , (7)
mjt, xjt, cjt, bjt, sjt ≥ 0 , j = f, i . and mt ≥ 0 ∀t.
In the above problem, bjt and sjt are respectively buyer and seller allocations to
sector j , j = f, i. Given the market crowding/congestion rates, total successful
matches for household agents sent to market j are bjtBjt for buyers and sjtSjt for
sellers. Total purchases are thus bjtBjtqjt, while total disutility is sjtSjtΦ (Qjt), j =
f, i. In (1), formal and underground goods are perfect substitutes in consumption
but underground goods may be of inferior quality: η ≤ 1.10 I define composite
10An alternative interpretation of η is that underground sellers use a less eﬃcient production
technology.
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consumption as ct = cft + ηcit, where cjt is consumption of sector j goods. A
fraction, τ , of formal sector purchases is paid as tax. Also, the government buys
oﬀ the quantity Qgt from formal buyers and pays for these units with money. Due
to perishability, the household consumes all goods brought home instantly. In (7),
incoming funds from sales, Xjt, arrive simultaneously as outgoing funds xjt during
purchases, j = f, i. Hence the former cannot be used to finance the latter within
the same period. Nominal income from sales to the government is PftQ
g
t , where
Pft is the price (more on this later).
I specify the timing of events next. Starting a period with money holdings mt,
the representative household makes decisions on the allocation of buyers, sellers
and money. The household also instructs its buyers and sellers on the terms of
trade, which include the oﬀers to make and/or accept in all successful matches.
t t+ 1
Decisions Markets Open Markets Close Pooling
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ −−−−−−−−−−−→
bjt, sjt Buyers → mjtbjt Taxes Paid Consumption
mjt, mt+1 Match, Bargain Govt. Purchases: Q
g
t
Terms of trade Produce, Trade
Next, the markets open. Formal agents visit only the formal market while informal
agents go to the underground market. Once in the market, agents match randomly
and one-on-one. Anonymity forbids credit transactions and trade is quid pro quo.
After a bargain is reached, a successfully matched seller produces the desired out-
put and trade is then finalized. As markets close, goods exiting the formal market
gates are all taxed. Each formal buyer compulsorily sells some quantity Qgt to
the government and receives money. Agents return to their respective households
where purchased goods and sales receipts are gathered. There is consumption and
the period ends.
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2.3 Terms of Trade
Notice that the terms of trade, {qjt, xjt}, essentially establishes the per-unit price,
pjt, which is implied by pjt =
xjt
qjt
, j = f, i. After the money and buyer allocations, a
representative buyer enters his assigned market j with mjtbjt units of money, j = f, i.
In each successful match, trade can occur if the oﬀer is acceptable to both sides. For
each implementable oﬀer, monetary payments cannot exceed the buyer’s money
holding upon entering the match: xjt ≤ mjtbjt , j = f, i. This feasibility constraint is
intrinsic to the environment, given that trade is quid pro quo.11
Let ωt be the value of money. Then, for an oﬀer to be accepted, it must satisfy
the seller’s individual rationality constraint. This is simply xjtωt ≥ Φ (qjt), j = f, i.
In both sectors, I allow buyers to hold all the bargaining power and to make take-
it-or-leave-it oﬀers. Optimal oﬀers ensure that the individual rationality constraint
holds with equality. Combined with the feasibility constraint, we have:
mjt
bjt
≥ Φ (qjt)
ωt
, j = f, i . (8)
Inequality (8) is named the cash-and-carry constraint and is the final constraint
on the household’s problem.
Sellers act as “oﬀer takers”, and take the quantity requested as given. Tem-
porarily assume that money is valued, allowing the cash-and-carry constraint to
bind in both sectors. Then one can rewrite the level of output-per-trade in each
sector as:
qjt =
∙
mjt
bjt
ωt
¸ 1
φ
, j = f, i . (9)
With quantities determined, the quantity-per-trade ratio, qitqft , can be readily de-
rived. I return to this later.
11Walrasian models of the underground economy are useful due to the ease of incorporating
credit. For ways to include credit in models with anonymous agents, see Berentsen, Camera and
Waller (2005).
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In summary, the terms of trade in matching between agents is simply xjt =
mjt
bjt
and qjt given by (9). Having established this, I next address the price Pft which the
government pays for goods. I allow agents to charge a premium on all sales to the
government to take account of matching costs. Specifically, I assume Pft =
pft
Xft .
2.4 Government
The definition of a sector as “underground” suggests the existence of an authority
that makes this distinction. There is a centralized government which implements
both monetary and fiscal policies. Money supply, Mt per capita household, grows
at the rate γ per period. Newly printed money, Tt = (γ − 1)Mt, is used by
the government in the market for payments for Qgt . Government’s real budget
constraint is:
G = τbftBftqft +Qgt , (10)
where G is an exogenous expenditure each period. Since part of government rev-
enues are nominal while expenditure is real, the government faces a liquidity con-
straint much like private households. This is:
(γ − 1)Mt = PftQgt . (11)
Note that the money growth rate and tax rate are endogenous. Consider a
reduction in τ . The government’s liquidity constraint goes into deficits as consis-
tent with the optimal region of the Laﬀer curve. This requires an adjustment in
transfers Tt to supply the funds necessary to alleviate the fiscal position, which in
turn changes γ. Thus, (10) and (11) emphasize the inherent interaction between
the fiscal and monetary policy variables τ and γ.
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3 Characterizing the equilibrium
This section examines the euler conditions that characterizes the equilibrium. Since
buyers make take-it-or-leave-it oﬀers on both islands, sellers exit each match with
zero net surplus. Households are thus indiﬀerent and randomize sellers between
sectors. This indiﬀerence explains why I focus on market congestion for buyers
only. I implement the equilibrium with a constant sector choice: sis ∈ (0, 1) such
that (5) is satisfied with equality.12
Let λjt, j = f, i, be the Lagrange multiplier on the cash-and-carry constraint
in each successful match. mjt is chosen such that the cash-and-carry constraint
binds to an equal extent in expectation in each sector: Bfλft = Biλit. The implied
euler condition for money is:
ωt
β
= ωt+1 + Bjt+1λjt+1 , j = f, i . (12)
Money kept between periods delivers its discounted value in the next period as well
as helps alleviate the cash-and-carry constraint in future trade matches. From (12),
it can be shown that both cash-and-carry constraints bind in all successful matches
in equilibrium if the return on money is suﬃciently low: γ > β. From this point
on, I assume this to be the case.
Next, I turn to the optimal quantity that is demanded in each trade match.
The associated first order conditions are derived as:
1− τ = λft
Φ (qft)
Ωt
φ
qft
+ ωt
dxft
dqft
and (13)
η = λit
Φ (qit)
Ωt
φ
qit
+ ωt
dxit
dqit
, (14)
which are similar to Shi (1999). Demanding a higher quantity yields marginal
utility from the additional units. The marginal cost is incurred at two levels. At
12In the calibration, I choose sf (and si) so that the model matches the underground-to-formal
sector output ratio as observed in data.
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the buyer level, demanding a larger quantity requires of the buyer to pay more
money, thus making the corresponding cash-and-carry constraint more binding.
The rate at which this constraint becomes more binding depends on how much
is required to motivate the seller to deliver the additional quantity, which in turn
depends on the seller’s production disutility costs on the margin. Secondly, as
buyers purchase higher quantities from the market and need more money to do so,
the household is pressured to deliver more money to its buyers. This causes the
liquidity constraint (7) to become more binding. Using (13) and (14), it is easy to
show that the first order condition for sft holds true for all values of sft ∈ [0, s].
Households are thus indiﬀerent on the allocation of sellers between sectors.
The first order condition for bft is given as:
Bft
∙
(1− τ) qft − λft
Φ (qft)
Ωt
− ωtxft
¸
= Bit
∙
ηqit − λit
Φ (qit)
Ωt
− ωtxit
¸
. (15)
Allocating more buyers to the formal sector generates more formal sector purchases
and yields the associated marginal benefits in consumption utility. All things being
equal, as more buyers visit the formal sector, mftbft declines and the cash-and-carry
constraint binds further in this sector. The household is pressured to deliver more
money to formal sector buyers, causing the liquidity constraint to become more
binding as well. A similar eﬀect pertains to the underground sector. For the
marginal buyer, the net benefits must be equal between sectors in expectation.
All households are alike and so I apply symmetry as usual. The only state
variable is money. To proceed to describe an equilibrium therefore, it is essential
to ensure that this variable evolves at a constant rate. Assuming fixed inflation
rate γ, the euler condition for money holding in steady state reduces to:
λjt =
γ − β
βBjt Ωt , j = f, i .
Substituting this into (13) to (15) gives (16) to (18) below.
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3.1 The Equilibrium
Definition 1 A symmetric monetary search equilibrium is defined as the tax rate
τ , the set of household choices (sf , bf ,mft)
∞
t=0 and the implied value of money
(ωt)
∞
t=0 such that given γ, the following requirements are met: (i) each household
solves its optimization problem; (ii) the representative household’s variables repli-
cate the aggregate equivalents; (iii) prices are positive, though bounded (the value
of money is positive and bounded); and (iv) the government budget balances.
In particular, an equilibrium involves a solution to a system of four equations
for bf , mft, ωt and τ :
1− τ =
∙
1 +
γ − β
βBf
¸
Ωt
mft
bf
φ
qf
, (16)
η =
∙
1 +
γ − β
βBi
¸
Ωt
mit
bi
φ
qi
, (17)
mit
bi
mft
bf
=
γ − β (1− Bf)
γ − β (1− Bi) , (18)
G = τbfBfqf + (γ − 1) MtPft (19)
and for completeness,
sft = sf , and sit = si .
Variables without the time subscript represent equilibrium real values. Those with
time subscripts are nominal values, which depend on the money stock at date t.
Given γ, there exists an equilibrium. The equations (16), (17) and (18) deliver
values for the household variables bf , mft and ωt, all in terms of τ . The required
tax rate that balances the budget, given γ, is then derived from (19). All other
variables - such as qj, λjt, cj, xjt, pjt, Bjt and Pft - can be derived as functions of
the four in the definition [see the appendix for further details].
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Equation (18) plays a central role in understanding the implications of the
model. First, the sector with the fewer trade opportunities per buyer always has
the higher money holding per buyer. If market overcrowding/congestion is worse
for formal buyers, each is compensated with higher sums of money. In other
words, if Bf < Bi, households take advantage of the intensive margin when buying
from the formal sector and the extensive margin when buying underground goods.
Secondly, suppose there is an increase in inflation, γ, with Bf < Bi. All things
being equal, more money is diverted to underground buyers per capita and qit
increases relative qft. That is, the erosive eﬀect of inflation on household money
stock increases tax evasion and seigniorage financing becomes less attractive. The
reverse is the case when market congestion is worse for buyers in the underground
market. A discussion of the eﬀect of inflation follows in the next section.
4 Size, Prices and Inflation
The quantity-per-trade ratio describes trade within an underground match relative
to a formal sector match and is denoted RI = qiqf . Summing over all such trade
encounters in each sector gives the aggregate output ratio in trades involving all
household buyers. This is denoted R = b
α
i s
1−α
i
bαf s
1−α
f
qi
qf
. The subscript I is used to denote
the intensive margin.
4.1 Relative Quantities and Relative Price
Since the cash-and-carry constraint binds in both sectors, (9) gives the quantity-
per-trade in each sector. Using this outcome together with (18), the equilibrium
quantity-per-trade ratio becomes:
RI =
∙
γ − β (1− Bf)
γ − β (1− Bi)
¸ 1
φ
,
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which completely describes the intensive margin. The intensive margin concerns
the quantity traded within each successful match, which depends on the amount
of money each buyer takes into a match. If trade opportunities are few for formal
buyers, households take advantage of each successful formal match to acquire large
quantities, which implies the expense of higher sums of money in formal matches
compared to underground matches. In other words, high market congestion for
formal buyers reduces the intensive ratio.13
Next, the aggregate trades equivalent is:
R =
biBi
bfBfRI , (20)
which is the underground-to-formal sector output ratio. Comparing with the inten-
sive ratio, R stresses the eﬀect of the matching rate on aggregate market outcomes.
Suppose RI is given. Then for the representative buyer sent to each island, the con-
gestion of the underground market relative to the formal market, BiBf , determines
the quantity of expected purchases by an underground buyer relative to a formal
buyer: BiBfRI . Preference and policy parameters η and τ are indirectly reflected in
R because households are mindful of the eﬀect of their buyer allocation decisions on
the eventual mix of goods that they consume. Given the bargaining outcome and
market crowding conditions, households employ their buyer allocation decision to
edge closer to their preferred mix of goods. The allocation of buyers and its eﬀect
on market crowding and aggregate trade outcomes is termed the extensive margin.
This margin is conclusively captured by R and decentralized trade is essential for
separating R from RI .
Again, price in each transaction as determined from the terms of trade is pjt =
mjt
bj
1
qj
, j = f, i in equilibrium. Using (18), the relative price ratio in private trades
13One can consider the eﬀect of technology as another dimension of the intensive margin.
Superior technology in the formal sector means that even with equal financial compensation,
formal sector sellers can deliver higher quantities within each trade meeting.
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reduces to pitpft =
mit
bi
mft
bf
1
RI
, or:
pit
pft
=
∙
γ − β (1− Bf)
γ − β (1− Bi)
¸1− 1φ
. (21)
The relative price is not only a function of preferences and taxes but also an
endogenous outcome of monetary policy, unlike in the earlier papers.14 With rel-
atively high market crowding for formal buyers, each brings more money into a
match and this increases the formal sector price relative to that underground. If
Bi < Bf , it is possible to generate higher prices in the underground sector. It is
worth noting however that pft is price before taxes. The eﬀective price ratio after
tax is pitpft (1− τ), which I report in section 5.
The ratio R has been the subject of virtually all of what is known in the
literature about the underground economy. The environment presented above
enables us to use published empirical estimates of R and back out the micro level
ratio RI as well as the price ratio pitpft as demonstrated. Some of these results may
be particularly useful since empirically, micro level data is unattainable in studies
on the underground economy.
4.2 Erosive Eﬀect of Inflation
Temporarily assume that monetary policy is via lump sum transfers to households
and also that dτdγ = 0.
15 Even in the face of changes in the inflation rate, households
are fully protected since they are recipients of transfers equal to the going rate of
inflation. In the equivalent case in Cavalcanti and Villamil (2003) as well as Nicolini
(1998), firms and households will not adjust their portfolios since the erosive eﬀect
14The price ratio (21) indirectly includes the parameters η and τ , since it aﬀects the buyer
allocation decision, which in turn aﬀects market congestion rates Bi and Bf .
15Specifically, government simply hands money to each buyer, instead of requesting Qgt units
of output. Temporarily ignore the eﬀect on the government budget.
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of inflation has no eﬀect on sectoral allocations. In the current paper however:
dRI
dγ
¯¯¯¯
τ
=
∙
Bi − Bf + ϕ
µ
dBf
dγ
,
dBi
dγ
¶¸
RI
A
where ϕ (·) is a function that is of the same sign as Bi − Bf and A is a positive
value.16
Assume that underground buyers have better matching success: Bi − Bf > 0.
When γ increases, households seek to spend nominal balances faster and they com-
mit more money to underground buyers compared to previously and this increases
RI . Further, households divert some buyers from the formal market to the less
congested underground market, as consistent with (18). Since bi increases, dBidγ < 0
and the household compensates underground buyers with even more money [this
part is captured by ϕ (·) > 0], which further increases RI . The eﬀect on the exten-
sive ratio R is in the same direction. Given that bi increases, aggregate matches
increase underground relative to the formal sector, holding sellers constant.
To summarize, whenmarket congestion is worse for buyers in the formal market,
dR
dγ
¯¯¯
τ
> 0. Seigniorage spending may help alleviate the tax rate and encourage
formalization. However, the erosive eﬀect of inflation on household money stock
reverses the seigniorage eﬀect. If this reversal is strong enough, it can generate a
total eﬀect dRdγ = 0 as suggested by Figure 3. On the other hand, if the underground
market holds fewer trade opportunities for each buyer (Bi − Bf < 0), then the
erosive eﬀect of inflation reinforces the seigniorage eﬀect in reducing the output
ratio. This makes seigniorage spending even more attractive.
Economic policy does not leave the relative price unchanged, unlike in several
earlier papers. If Bi − Bf > 0, underground prices rise and approaches formal
sector levels as the rate of inflation increases:
d pitpft
dγ
¯¯¯¯
¯
τ
=
∙
Bi − Bf + ϕ
µ
dBf
dγ
,
dBi
dγ
¶¸
(φ− 1)
pit
pft
A
.
16See the appendix for A and ϕ.
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Intuitively, increased inflation implies that each underground buyer starts to hold
more money compared to previously (if Bi − Bf > 0). Thus, underground buyers
begin to demand higher quantities in each trade and they need to pay higher
prices to motivate the additional units. This change in the relative price implies a
marginal decline in RI , however this eﬀect is of second order and does not reverse
the initial rise in RI and R. While changes in fiscal policy can aﬀect the output
ratio in some of the environments with centralized markets, the isolated eﬀect
of inflation on household portfolio allocations and the relative price is a unique
outcome of decentralized exchange [see the appendix for a comparison].
4.3 The Ramsey Problem (Optimal Inflation)
Bailey (1956) and Phelps (1973) brought the subject of optimal inflation into the
fold of public finance. In this seminal contribution, Phelps advocates for a positive
tax on the liquidity services that money provides if taxes on other goods and
services are distortionary. This argument favours a positive nominal interest rate,
or simply, positive inflation. Intuitively, tax distortions are socially costly while
inflation presents the usual welfare consequences. The task facing a benevolent
government is to find the best trade-oﬀ between the deadweight loss from tax
financing and that from seigniorage financing.
The focus of the Ramsey problem is to find the optimal mix of consumption
and inflation taxes. Without money, the cash-and-carry constraint (8) cannot be
satisfied and the economy described in this paper degenerates into autarky. In the
spirit of Kiyotaki and Wright (1989), money acts as an intermediate commodity
that facilitates trade. Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) established a general result
emphasizing the undesirability of taxing the intermediate goods sector when all
final goods and services fall under the tax radar. In monetary economics, their
conclusion implies that inflationary tax should not be used despite the distortions
caused by taxes on the final goods sector.17 However, where there is a third sector
17Also, see Kimbrough (1986), Faig (1988), Guidotti and Vegh (1992), Chari, Christiano and
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that evades regular taxes, the optimal policy set may include positive seigniorage.
The Trade-oﬀ
The formalized Ramsey problem is to solve the household’s problem subject
the first order conditions and the government’s budget constraints. This problem
in the typical environment with competitive trade and evadable taxes involves a
trade-oﬀ between (i) output ratio distortions created by formal sector taxes and
(ii) the welfare cost of inflation. Assume that the optimal policy set from this
trade-oﬀ is the pair {τa, γa}.
The additional dimension provided in the framework with decentralized ex-
change is the coordination problem that arises from market congestion.18 To il-
lustrate, suppose sellers are distributed evenly between the two sectors. Then, to
minimize search frictions and maximize aggregate matches (Xf + Xi), buyers must
also be allocated equally between sectors. Suppose instead that the allocation of
buyers is skewed towards the underground sector, causing high market congestion
for buyers in that sector. The optimal policy set includes low taxes: τ 1 < τa and
high seigniorage: γ1 > γa. Low taxes edge buyers back into the formal market and
improves the coordination problem. Here, lowering the tax rate implies govern-
ment needs more seigniorage income, hence high γ. Two factors account for this
negative relationship between τ and γ in this case. The first is the traditional argu-
ment that as γ increases, seigniorage income rises, which finances the government
and helps reduce τ . The second is that as γ increases, buyers move to the formal
sector via the extensive margin in order to spend money faster. Thus, more goods
become taxable, which also means the tax rate can adjust downwards even further.
For both of these factors, dτdγ < 0 when the underground market has the higher
market crowding for buyers.19 Apart from the trade-oﬀ between distorting taxes
Kehoe (1996).
18For more on second best taxation in environments with externalities, see Sandmo (1975), Ng
(1980), Goulder (1995) and Bovenberg and van der Ploeg (1998).
19See the upper right panel of Figure 1.
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and the welfare cost of inflation, the Ramsey problem seeks to even out market
crowding rates in the two sectors and improve the coordination problem.
When the market is more congested for formal buyers, the opposite is gener-
ally the case and optimal policy involves τ 2 > τ 1 and γ2 < γ1. In comparison to
{τa, γa} however, the eﬀect of inflation is less clear-cut. There are three factors
of importance, being tax distortions, the welfare cost of inflation and market con-
gestion. Temporarily consider the first two only. Taxes move buyers out of the
formal market. When Bf < Bi, inflation also moves buyers out of the formal mar-
ket, since buyers go to the informal market where trade opportunities are better.
Thus, inflation and taxes both increase tax evasion in this case. Holding taxes con-
stant, marginally reduce inflation. Seigniorage incomes decline, but tax revenues
increase even with no change to the tax rate. This is because buyers return to the
congested formal market, given less urgency to spend money. Depending on the
influx of buyers into the formal market, the rise in tax revenues can outweigh losses
in seigniorage income. Thus, a lower tax rate becomes possible: dτdγ > 0.
20 This
underscores the solution that lowering seigniorage financing and lowering taxes can
work together to improve welfare and yet balance the budget.
In this second case (the case where Bf < Bi), does a benevolent policymaker
choose some low pair {τ ; γ = β}, so long as it balances the budget? This is where
the final dimension, market crowding, plays a role. Recall that since Bf < Bi,
lower taxes and lower inflation both have the same eﬀect in moving buyers to the
crowded formal market. Thus, for low-enough levels of γ and τ , too many buyers
enter the already-crowded formal market and the coordination problem worsen.
This hinders trade and reduces welfare. In summary, the optimal policy may
include τ 2 < τa and γ2 < γa when Bf < Bi, but this does not guarantee that
Friedman rule becomes optimal.21 Here again, the Ramsey problem finds optimal
policy after considering not only tax distortions and the welfare cost of inflation,
20The analysis here is aimed at explaining our simulation results as in section 5, for the case
where Bf < Bi. See the upper right panel of Figure 2.
21See upper left panel of Figure 2.
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but also market congestion.
5 Calibration and Results
This section calibrates the model to match data from Peru and conducts three
policy experiments. The first experiment is to vary γ, with dτdγ = 0. This isolates
the change in households decisions with higher inflation and shows the eﬀect on
RI and R. The second is to vary τ alone and evaluate the eﬀect on these ratios. In
the third experiment, I endogenize the interaction between γ and τ and evaluate
the optimal policy set, or the Ramsey solution. In each of these experiments, I
consider the case where the formal sector has the higher market congestion for
buyers as well as that in which the opposite is the case.
I normalize the number of sellers, s, to unity. Using time diary data, Juster
and Staﬀord (1991) estimate that US residents spend on average 23.9 hours on
paid work and 6.8 hours shopping per week. b is set to 6.8
23.9 . This figure is adopted
for Peru, but considered a lower bound for time spent shopping in that country.22
TABLE 1
PERU
Parameters Economic Indicators Target
Period β φ α s b Mt τ γ12−1 R
1 Month .997 1.2 .5 1 6.8
23.9 1 12.71% 2.24% 44%
Data on tax revenue as a percentage of GDP is retrieved from the World De-
velopment Indicators (WDI) database of the World Bank. This is used to approx-
imate τ . Also collected from the same database is average annual CPI inflation
for 2000 to 2005, which is used to represent γ12 − 1. Finally, an estimate of the
underground-to-formal output ratio is taken from Schneider and Enste (2000) and
used to represent R.
22The appendix includes sensitivity analysis on b, φ and α.
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Specifically, the equations I calibrate are (16) to (20). Temporarily assume
that we know sf (and hence si). Then, given the above values for τ , G, γ, b, β
and α, equations (16), to (19) are used to get bf , mft, ωt and Qg. The remaining
requirement is to verify sf . The model is simulated for the value sf such that
the relative size of the underground economy, R, equals 0.44, as consistent with
(20). This completes the calibration. The value of sf derived from each scenario
is retained for all other simulations. (20) is thus used to evaluate the new level of
R, given each policy set that is fed into the model.23
Suppose underground goods are just as good as formal sector goods: η = 1.
Taxes cause households to send relatively fewer buyers to the formal sector and
there is a tendency for high market congestion for underground buyers (Bi < Bf).
TABLE 2
CALIBRATION OUTCOMES
η 1 .85
Peru US Peru US
bi
b .3351 .0897 .2999 .0773
si
s .0920 .0253 .3699 .1303
mit
mt
.5285 .1609 .2680 .0590
Bi .9824 .9947 2.0820 2.4335
Bf 2.1908 1.9400 1.7786 1.8202
qi .3921 .3913 .3972 .3975
qf .2014 .2247 .4528 .5060
RI 1.9466 1.7411 .8773 .7855
R .4400 .0880 .4400 .0880
pit
pft
(1− τ) .9973 .9974 .8503 .8506
Qg .0001 .0001 .0001 .0002
G .0107 .0122 .0205 .0261
23For the sake of comparison, I also calibrate the US economy for which data is collected
similarly and from the same sources, with R = .088, τ = .1073 and γ12 = 1.028262.
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Each underground buyer is handed a relatively high sum of money: mitmt >
bi
b , or
alternatively put, mftmt <
bf
b . Since each underground buyer holds more money
per capita, they can buy more units and the intensive margin thus ensures that
RI > 1. In order to match the output ratio with R < 1, few sellers are allocated
to the underground market so that the aggregate number of matches underground
is low.
For suﬃciently low η however, market congestion is reversed, with the formal
sector being more congested for buyers. Market congestion improves for each
remaining underground buyer
¡ bi
b <
si
s
¢
, requiring lower money allocation to these
buyers: mitmt <
bi
b . Since each underground buyer bears lower money stocks, they
buy fewer units per capita compared to formal buyers and RI < 1. Since there
are more formal matches than underground, the extensive margin reinforces the
intensive margin with R < RI . The quantity Qg is real government revenue from
seigniorage spending. The values are however small for both countries compared
to the total government budget G.
Next, I turn to the policy experiments. The upper panel of Table 3 reports
simulations of the model for diﬀerent levels of money growth for a given tax rate
for the case where trade opportunities are better for formal buyers than for un-
derground buyers (ignoring the consequence on the government budget). As the
inflation rate increases, there is higher urgency to spend nominal balances and
households move buyers to the formal market. Thus, bib falls steadily. Also, each
formal buyer is handed more money compared to previously and mitbi falls. On
both the intensive and extensive margins, the output ratio declines. The nega-
tive eﬀect of inflation on the output ratio - holding taxes constant - is consistent
with Koreshkova (2006) in which credit services are employed to attain a similar
eﬀect with centralized markets. Due to the erosive eﬀect of inflation, consumption
declines in both sectors. As inflation increases from 2.24% to 10% per annum,
the required compensation in composite consumption units is only 0.13% of the
previous consumption level. In the lower panel, I vary the tax rate while keeping
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the inflation rate fixed (again, ignore the government budget). As expected, higher
taxes cause measurable declines in welfare.
In Table 4, I present the same simulations for an economy in which η = 0.85.
Notice that I choose sf (and hence si) appropriately such that for the benchmark
policy values {τ , γ} = {.1271, 1.0244}, the economy is characterized by the ob-
served output ratio, being R = 0.44. Thus, the initial degree of tax evasion is the
same as in Table 3. When we increase inflation with taxes constant, again buyers
move to the market with lower market congestion, which in this case is the under-
ground market. This sector increases in both the intensive and extensive margins.
This confirms the theoretical result that when market congestion is higher for for-
mal buyers, inflation increases R. In absolute terms, consumption of both formal
and underground goods decline since inflation is a tax on money. However, larger
declines in production disutility
³
DisU =sftSftqφft + sitSitqφit
´
contributes to mar-
ginal improvements in welfare. An increase in taxation at constant money growth
also moves buyers underground and increases R. As expected, this is welfare-costly,
although to a much smaller than the lower panel of Table 3. The diﬀerence is that
in Table 4, taxation is not so evil since it forces buyers to exit the formal market
to the underground sector, which improves the coordination problem.
The introduction outlined how the data suggests that changes in inflation leave
the relative size unchanged. Subsection 4.2 argued that although the seigniorage
eﬀect reduces R, the erosive eﬀect of inflation can cause a reversal. We do achieve
the reversal in the upper panel of Table 4, unlike in earlier papers. However, the
margin is rather modest [but see the next subsection].
5.1 Optimal Inflation Tax
The optimal policy set are in Table 5. It is important to note that the higher opti-
mal inflation recommended for the economy with η = 1 is not because that economy
has higher tax evasion. In fact, in both economies, I start oﬀ with R = 0.44 as
shown in Table 2. Instead, the economy with η = 1 has higher optimal inflation
26
because of higher market congestion for buyers in the underground market. Infla-
tion does not only bring seigniorage income, it also reduces tax evasion as buyers
start to take advantage of lower market crowding in the formal market. This acts
as an additional incentive for seigniorage financing, which explains the optimal
rate of 42.69% in Peru. We still get such high optimal rates even for η = 1 − ε;
ε being an arbitrarily small positive number. In that case, inflation increases the
relative consumption of higher-quality formal sector goods. This outcome is new,
and opposite to that found in Peterson and Shi (2004), where inflation increases
the consumption of lower quality goods and strictly reduces welfare.
Table 5
Peru
η 1 .85 Nicolini (1998)24 Data
τ (γ) .0998 0.1246 not comparable Mean 1976-1995 2005
γ12 − 1 .4269 .014 .1495 to .0354 6.25 .016
On the other hand, when the overcrowding of buyers is higher in the formal
sector (η = .85), inflation increases in R, which acts as a disincentive to seigniorage
financing. The optimal inflation rate here is 1.4%, despite the large tax-evading
sector. Figure 2 warrants further explanation. As γ increases, seigniorage income
(Qg) rises, as consistent with models with centralized markets. Given G, seignior-
age helps alleviate tax financing. However, as γ increases, buyers exit the formal
market in search for better matching rates underground (Bi > Bf). As they do
24Nicolini (1998) studies optimal inflation when relative credit use is diﬀerent between the
formal and underground sectors. For diﬀerent configurations of relative credit-use, he finds
optimal annual interest rates between 7.34% and 19.17%. In Table 5, I convert these estimates
into inflation rates using the Fisher equation as in section 6. The tax rate in that paper is
calibrated diﬀerently and not compared above.
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so, the turnover of taxable goods decline, along with tax revenues, at the going
tax rate. Tax revenues decline at a rate faster than the gains from seigniorage,
requiring τ to rise along with γ.
The results are worth comparing with those found in Nicolini (1998); also
calibrated to Peru. Nicolini considers an economy in which the relative use of credit
is higher in the formal market. Inflation thus taxes underground cash-denominated
transactions more than formal credit-denominated trades. For diﬀerent relative
credit-use levels, he documents the optimal rate of inflation. The results show that
even without any assumptions regarding credit-use, there can be large variations
in the optimal rate of inflation if trade is decentralized. Integrating credit can
further diverge these rates and better account for the prevalence of inflation in
poor countries.
6 Discussion
The economic environment discussed above is directly equivalent to one in which
households interact with a centralized market for government bonds. Augmenting
the household’s liquidity constraint with bonds, the euler condition for bonds is
ωt
β = ωt+1 (1 + rt+1), where rt is the net nominal interest rate. Comparing this
euler condition with (12), the interest rate is derived as:
r = Bf λftωt = Bi
λit
ωt
≡ γ − β
β
.
Friedman rule involves setting γ to β, or alternatively, r to zero.
In the environment presented in this paper, households randomize sellers be-
tween sectors due to take-it-or-leave-it oﬀers by buyers. Employing Nash bargain-
ing can allow interesting dimensions on seller allocation. Such an extension can
strengthen results discussed in this paper. In response to changes in monetary
and/or tax policies, sellers are likely to move in the same direction as buyers,
further strengthening the results on the extensive margin.
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Some contributions in the literature stress the importance of credit in formal
sector trades, unlike in the informal sector. With higher inflation, agents resort
to more credit trades, which increases the formal sector in relative terms [see Ko-
reshkova (2006)]. The alternative approach used in this paper is motivated by
the concern that credit services may not be exclusively produced by - nor exclu-
sively used in - the formal sector. It is not clear how credit-use will aﬀect relative
underground output when inflation changes [see Besley and Levenson (1996)].25
This paper generate endogenous micro level trade ratios including the quantity-
per-trade ratio and the relative price. A somewhat related paper in the literature is
McLaren (1998). He considers a non-monetary economy with markets for imported
goods. There are several markets, each for a specific class of imported goods.
Depending on the tax rate and the concentration of tax inspectors in a given
market, traders decide either to import legally and pay the associated taxes or
to smuggled at a risk of detection. Quantity per importer is fixed and only the
choice of sector is endogenously influenced by policy. In equilibrium, traders in the
market for a particular class of good are all simultaneously legitimate importers
or all smugglers. Although separate prices can be derived for the two sectors, only
one is operational for each commodity class. He then studied the optimal tax and
audit rates in a Ramsey-type equilibrium. The current paper on the other hand
endogenizes production quantities, prices and sector choice, and these depend on
fundamentals as well as economic policy, including money.
A possible extension is to introduce capital into the environment examined in
this paper. First, notice that the model presented above can be interpreted as one
with constant returns to scale production technology involving labour: qjt = ljt,
j = f, i, where ljt is labour input. In this case, the disutility of production reverts
to disutility of labour: Φ (ljt). The introduction of capital simply involves employ-
25Besley and Levenson (1996) documents high prevalence of Rotating Saving and Credit As-
sociations in many developing countries allowing informal sector agents access to financial inter-
mediation. Participation rates are as high as 45% among high income groups in Taiwan, which
is significant relative to participation rates in underground production.
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ing a more general production function and an appropriate capital accumulation
equation. In this vain, this extension compels one to take a stand on which good(s),
formal or underground, can be accumulated into capital, if not both. How exactly
are they combined in the constitution of a uniform capital stock?
7 Conclusion
The conclusions to draw from this paper are two-fold. First, the data fails to
support conventional wisdom that inflation reduces the relative size of the under-
ground economy. Changes in the underground-to-formal sector output ratio seem
unaﬀected by changes in the rate of inflation. I develop a theoretical framework
that explains the evidence. The solution I propose is that over time (or across
countries), the relative overcrowding of the formal and underground markets for
buyers can change (can be diﬀerent). Where the formal market is more crowded
for buyers, inflation can cause households to compromise on the quality of goods
they consume and commit more money and more buyers to the underground sec-
tor. In this case, relative underground output increases both on the intensive and
extensive margins. When the underground sector is more overcrowded for buyers
however, inflation achieves the opposite result. The relative size of the underground
economy declines and consumption of higher-quality formal sector goods increases.
Inflation can thus move underground output in both directions, as consistent with
data.
The second conclusion is as follows. In the presence of an underground sector,
tax distortions are socially costly while inflation presents the usual welfare conse-
quences. If both sector markets are perfectly competitive, the task facing a benev-
olent government is to find the best trade-oﬀ between the deadweight loss from
tax financing and that from seigniorage financing. With decentralized trade how-
ever, optimal policy also seeks to correct the coordination problem that arises when
market overcrowding is unbalanced between sectors. When underground goods are
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of considerably good quality, there is overcrowding of buyers underground. The
benevolent government reduces the formal sector tax rate to encourage buyers back
into this sector. Optimal policy thus involves high seigniorage financing and low
taxes. I find optimal inflation rate as high as 42% per annum for Peru. Although
this rate is lower than the rates observed in that country from the mid 1970s to
the mid 1990s, it does oﬀer a general explanation for the high rates of inflation in
some developing countries within the context of optimal public finance policy.
When underground goods are very inferior, the formal sector tends to be more
crowded for buyers. Optimal policy seeks to reduce the overcrowding of buyers in
the formal sector. This requires high taxes combined with low seigniorage spending.
For the relevant configuration of the model, I generate an optimal annual inflation
rate of 1.4% for Peru, which is close to the rate observed in that country in 2005.
In Peru, the size of underground output relative to the formal sector is estimated
at 44%.26 With such high rates of tax evasion, a familiar assertion in the literature
calls for high reliance on seigniorage financing. The results in this paper show that
the optimal inflation rate can be far lower than suggested in the literature.
On the theory front, this paper makes significant inroads towards the integra-
tion of fiscal policy instruments into the monetary search literature. I showed that
the model is also adaptable for the inclusion of capital, thus allowing the familiar
neoclassical growth theory analysis. Finally, the environment proposed is flexible
and permits applications to other sectoral divisions of the economy.
26See Schneider and Enste (1998).
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Appendix
The household solves:
v (mt) = max
bjt,sjt,mjt,qjt,mt+1,j=f,i
cft + ηcit − sftSftΦ (Qft)− sitSitΦ (Qit)
+βEv (mt+1) + bftBftλft
∙
mft
bft
− Φ (qft)
Ωt
¸
+ bitBitλit
∙
mit
bit
− Φ (qit)
Ωt
¸
+ωt [mt + sftSftXft + PftQgt + sitSitXit − bftBftxft − bitBitxit −mt+1]
The Euler conditions (12) to (15) follow direct from the above set up. Now, I
proceed to show how I arrived at (16), (17) and (18). First, note that if money is
valued, λjt ≥ 0, j = f, i and hence xjt = Φ(qjt)Ωt and
dxjt
dqjt
=
Φ(qjt)
Ωt
φ
qjt
, j = f, i. This
substituted into (13), (14) and (15) yield:
1− τ = [λft + ωt]
Φ (qft)
Ωt
φ
qft
,
η = [λit + ωt]
Φ (qit)
Ωt
φ
qit
and
Bf
∙
(1− τ) qft −
½
λft +
ωt
1− τ
¾
Φ (qft)
Ωt
¸
= Bi
∙
ηqit −
½
λit +
ωt
1− δ
¾
Φ (qit)
Ωt
¸
.
To simplify these three FOCs further, consider the following two properties of the
equilibrium. First, with a constant money growth rate mt+1 = γmt, the value of
money declines at the growth rate of money: mt+1ωt+1 = mtωt. Thus the euler for
money gives γωtmt = βωt+1mt+1 + βBfλft+1mt+1. Rearranging,
Bfλft = (1− δ)Biλit = γ − ββ ωt . (22)
Second, due to the restriction γ ≥ β, λjt ≥ 0, j = f, i and the cash and carry
constraints bind in all transactions:
mjt
bjt
ωt = q
φ
jt , j = f, i (23)
Substituting (22) and (23) in the FOCs for output and imposing symmetry (ωt =
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Ωt and Qjt = qjt, j = f, i etc), we have:
1− τ = γ − β (1− Bf)
βBf ωt
mft
bft
φ
qft
(16)
η =
γ − β (1− Bi)
βBi ωt
mit
bit
φ
qit
(17)
Again, substituting (22) and (23) in the first order condition for buyers and im-
posing symmetry gives:
Bf
∙
(1− τ) qft −
γ − β (1− Bf)
βBf ωt
mft
bft
¸
= Bi
∙
ηqit −
γ − β (1− Bi)
βBi ωt
mit
bit
¸
.
Simplifying using (16), (17) gives:
mit
bi
mft
bf
=
γ − β (1− Bf)
γ − β (1− Bi) . (18)
At the government side (19) follows easily from (10) and (11).
The derivation of all the ratios are explained in the paper. dRIdγ follows directly
from quotient rule, where ϕ (·) = [γ − β + βBit] dBftdγ − [γ − β + βBft] dBitdγ and A =
φ
β [γ − β (1− Bft)] [γ − β (1− Bit)].
The cash-in-advance model:
v (mt) = max
cjt,mjt,qjt,mt+1,j=f,i
(1− τ) cft −Qgt + ηcit − Φ (qft)− Φ (qit) + βEv (mt+1)
+λft [mft − pftcft] + λit [mit − pitcit]
+ωt [mt + pftqft + pitqit − pft (cft −Qgt )− pitcit −mt+1]
The Money Euler is ωt−1β = λjt+ωt, j = f, i, which implies that λjt =
γ−β
β ωt. The
FOC qjt are Φ0 (qjt) = ωtpjt, j = f, i. The FOC cjt are:
1− τ = (λft + ωt) pft
η = (λit + ωt) pit
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These simplify to 1− τ = γβωtpft and η =
γ
βωtpit. Thus, the ratios become:
pit
pft
=
η
1− τ
qit
qft
=
∙
η
1− τ
¸ 1
φ−1
A summary comparison of the models is in Table 6:
TABLE 6
COMPARISON OF MODELS
Walrasian Search
Price Ratio
pit
pft
η
1−τ
∙
γ−β(1−Bft)
γ−β(1−Bit)
¸1− 1φ
Quantity Ratios
RI n.a
∙
γ−β(1−Bft)
γ−β(1−Bit)
¸ 1
φ
R
£ η
1−τ
¤ 1
φ−1 Xit
Xft
∙
γ−β(1−Bft)
γ−β(1−Bit)
¸ 1
φ
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Data
1. Data on the relative size of the underground economy (R) was culled from
Schneider and Enste (2000). The other ratio, RI , is derived using these values
of R and formulas outlined in section 4.
2. Figure 3 does not show country names against the data points due to over-
crowding. The data is available upon request. The regression ∆UE =
β0 + β1∆γ gives β0 = 1.2486, β1 = 0.0872, R2 = 0.0007 and p-values of
0.7913 and 24.9586 respectively.
3. In Figure 7, I retrieve annual data on fines and forfeits (Ft) from the IMF’s
Government Finance Statistics. The ratios plotted, δ, are then calculated as
the ratio of these revenues to underground output (UEt) in each country. For
example, according to Schneider and Enste (2000), for every dollar of output
produced in the oﬃcial sector, there is $0.088 worth of output produced
underground in the US. GDP values were retrieved from the International
Financial Statistics database, from which UEt was derived as 8.8% in the
case of the US. δUS is then estimated as:
δUS =
1
T
X
t
FUSt
UEUSt
× 100% ,
where t is the year. Ft and UEt are both in local currency units. The data
period ranged from 1965 to 1995. Unreported years were omitted.
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